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THE MARITAL DEDUCTION-USE AND
FORM OF THE MARITAL BEQUEST-
FREDERIC SAMMOND**
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF SUBJECT.
When the 1948 Congress adopted the principle of the marital de-
duction for estate and gift taxes, it opened a subject that would occupy
and fascinate lawyers in estate planning and estate administration for
many years. While there are undoubtedly more cases now on the way
to becoming authorities and citations, we are still at the stage of being
largely dependent on the statute as written and as interpreted by the
regulations; there are no decisions of importance on the subject. Such
decisions as there are simply give strict application to the severe limi-
tations of the allowance. We are still using Section 81.47 of Regula-
tions 105, along with the new statute Section 2056, I.R.C., pending new
regulations, but there is no reason to expect much change, when they
are issued.
The statute is one of those difficult ones where the draftsman
started out with a good idea: the equalization of estates under the
common law and the civil law. As you read it, you can picture the
draftsman discovering one situation after another in which the statute
might operate too favorably for the taxpayer, and putting in a stop or
limitation clause, following which another member of the group would
discover a discrimination against the taxpayer and immediately an ex-
ception to the limitation would be drafted, which in turn was found to
require qualification. In my opinion an attempt has been made to make
the statute too precise, inviting difficulty, in an attempt to avoid un-
fairness in a situation where isolated unfairnesses are unavoidable
anyway. Basically, of course, the purpose of the law is to allow the
estates of spouses to be equalized and to allow as a deduction, within
limits, that which will appear in the estate of the survivor (unless the
survivor consumes it), and nothing more.
The Revenue Act of 1954 made few changes in this field, but
happily does away with two restrictions that tripped people very easily.
One was the provision that prohibited portions of a trust or life in-
surance policy from being used as deductions no matter how well such
portion qualified and the other was the rule that denied a deduction
for a legal life estate otherwise qualified merely because it was a trust.
These changes will be discussed in their place.
* This paper was delivered as a lecture on November 24, 1954, in the Estate
Planning Course which forms a part of Marquette University Law Schoors
Continuing Legal Education Program.
** Partner in the law firm of Fairchild, Foley, and Sammond; Milwaukee, Wis-
consin.
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Since we are happily in a common law state, I do not attempt to
explore any part of the community property portions of the statute.
Most of you will recall that there was agitation for many years over
the fact that, before the federal statutes recognized the marital deduc-
tion concept, there were about a dozen civil law states where the com-
munity property principle permitted substantially the same results for
income tax, estate tax and gift tax that the Revenue Act of 1948
later granted to married couples in all states. There were more or less
mild grumblings through the depression years, and these rose to a de-
cided crescendo during World War II along with the equally high tax
brackets. Several common law states proposed to adopt community
property laws; and our neighbor Michigan even did so with a law en-
acted shortly before 1948 which got their titles and trusts into a great
deal of difficulty, and was repealed after the Revenue Act of 1948 was
passed. Several other states were on the verge of passing similar laws,
and it was even proposed and discussed in Wisconsin. As might be
expected where one-quarter of the states were enjoying a tremendous
advantage, it did not remain exclusive very long in the hands of the
congressmen from the other three quarters. As I recall it, the high tax
enthusiasts proposed laws to take the privilege away in the civil law
states, but not only were there constitutional doubts with regard to this
course, but rewards of the other course were too attractive to the rest
of us. Of course, the principal advantage came through the income
tax provision which is applied much more universally as well as an-
nually, but the estate and gift tax provisions offer substantial savings.
It is, of course, appropriate to discuss the advantages and disad-
vantages of the marital deduction in estate planning, but, before doing
so, it may be desirable to examine the device itself. As it is a highly
technical concept, this discussion may well first take the form of ex-
amining the ways in which the deduction may advertently be lost. The
marital deduction is available, of course, upon the death of the earlier
of two spouses, but for convenience in discussion I shall treat the
masculine gender as more perishable and the feminine gender as the
survivor, as seems to be the case in life.
II. EXPLICIT STATUTORY BARRIERS TO MARITAL DEDUCTION.
A reading of the statute suggests quite a number of places where
marital deductions can be lost in the process of trying to meet the
general wishes of a testator.
(a) The basic purpose of the marital deduction requires that the
surviving spouse in all events shall so own the bequest as to include
it in her estate. This is the reason for the great effort in the statute to
exclude "terminable interests" however contrived. For many years the
standard estate planning, as a minimum, provided a life estate to the
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spouse with remainder to the succeeding generations. This was the
basic tool, and still is, where the marital deduction is not helpful. To
the extent of half of the estate, this life estate and next generation idea
obviously loses the marital deduction, and the basic purpose to by-pass
the estate of the survivor in favor of the next generation is squarely
at odds with the purpose of the marital deduction. Not only is this true
as to simple life estates, but also as to a life estate where the right of
the survivor or her estate to the remainder is conditioned in any way,
as by continued widowhood or consent of anyone else. In short, the
remainder must vest in the survivor, although there is no objection to
giving the survivor a life estate with the remainder to her own estate
or with a power of appointment, testamentary or otherwise. It was
formerly important that a life estate, accompanied with a power of ap-
pointment, did not qualify for the deduction, unless it is specifically
provided through a trust designed to meet the very specific require-
ments of subsection (e) of the statute.1 In other words, a devise of a
life interest in a farm with power of appointment was not valid if the
trust form was not used. There was no logical reason for this distinc-
tion and it might easily have trapped people, so it was one of the two
limitations which went out in the 1954 Code.2
A bequest to a fiduciary to purchase assets for the survivor is de-
clared unqualified if it would be similar to an annuity or a term interest
of some kind as distinguished from purchase of an investment.3 This
is a rare device and of no practical importance as a restriction if not
met inadvertently.
Under the 1948 Act, the power of appointment following life estate
not only had to be in trust as mentioned, but also had to be a life estate
and power relating to the whole corpus.4 Quite a number of such be-
quests have already gone down on this. Under the 1954 Code a specific
portion of a corpus may qualify for the deduction if the life estate
and the power relate to the same specific portion.5
(b) One of the most important statutory disqualifications, and one
which well might produce more inadvertent loss of the deduction than
any other, is that which is plainly stated, but which I fear many of us
have not appreciated sufficiently in our planning work. This is the
provision that, if a bequest to the surviving spouse may be satisfied
out of assets which include any asset which is not qualified for the
marital deduction, it shall conclusively be presumed that such asset was
included in the bequest and the bequest to that extent fails to qualify.6
1 §812 (e) (1) (F) of the old Code.
2§2056 (b) (5).
3 §2056 (b) (1).
4 Note 1, supra.
5 Note 2, supra.
6 §2056 (b) (2).
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It is not at all unusual for a marital bequest to be designated out of
the residue, or by percentage of the whole, or, if made the subject of
a specific bequest, for there to be no specifications of what assets shall
be used to satisfy the marital bequest. In either case, where there is
any unallowable asset in the estate, it is immediately conclusively at-
tributed to the marital bequest, and the deduction thereof is reduced
accordingly.
Examples of unallowable or "tainted assets" are various terminable
interests, including those terminating by remarriage, partnership in-
terests, sale of property by a fiduciary on an installment basis, and
property passing through the exercise or non-exercise of a nontaxable
power.
A good example of what might frequently be encountered is an
inter vivos trust created by decedent with income to decedent and wife
for their lives and remainder to children. The income interest would
be an asset in his estate, but an unqualified asset. It and any other un-
qualified asset would be treated as used to pay the marital deduction
(whether so used or not) and reduce the deduction. This "tainted
asset" clause, while still important, has lost some of its sting with the
removal by the 1954 Code from the list of unqualified assets of (1)
life estates with powers which are not trusteed and (2) portions of a
trust.
Where there is any likelihood of an unqualified asset existing in the
estate, the effect of this statutory clause can easily be removed by a
simple sentence in the will to the effect that the marital bequest shall be
satisfied only out of assets as to which the marital deduction would be
allowed if the same passed directly from the decedent to the spouse.
(c) The statute provides that a bequest may be conditioned upon
survival for a specified period not exceeding six months or, alternative-
ly, if death occurs as a result of a common disaster causing the death
of both, provided that the surviving spouse does in fact take.7 While
this provision undoubtedly meets the wishes of many testators, it
nevertheless indicates very clearly how the entire marital deduction
advantage may be destroyed by the operation of such a clause where
the survivor does in fact die within the period specified in the will, or
as a result of a common disaster. The usual purpose of such a clause
is to avoid the expense of double administration, something which has
been faced and allowed for as a rule, in calculating the desirability and
size of the marital deduction bequest. This situation must be care-
fully considered not only .in drafting of wills, but with regard to similar
clauses in life insurance policies, if frustration of the plan of marital
deduction is not to be risked.
7 §2056 (b) (3).
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Wisconsin is one of the many states with the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act which provides that, in the absence of evidence of which
person died first, neither shall take from the other.8 It will be seen
that the operation of this Act may very well defeat an ordinary un-
conditioned bequest in a will or a marital deduction in an intestate
estate. The conventional common disaster clause in wills works the
same way, of course. It operates as it is intended to do, not only to
avoid difficult questions of proof, but also dual administration of the
same assets, while such dual administration is the very thing that is the
essential of the marital deduction. The Simultaneous Death Act con-
tains a provision that a contrary provision in a will or insurance policy
shall prevail, and it may well be that it would be desirable in some wills
and insurance policies to negative the operation of this Act by a clause
so saying.
Where, for one reason or another, it is desired to take advantage
of the statutory clause which retains the marital deduction and yet
permits the defeat of the bequest where the surviving spouse dies
within a limited period or in a common disaster, it is exceedingly im-
portant to be clear that in the event the surviving spouse does not so
die, any powers of appointment in a life insurance policy or otherwise
will be operative from the date of death and not from the date when
the condition has been eliminated. For example, where a bequest or life
insurance policy is stated to be conditioned on survival for more than
six months and is dependent for its deductibility on its power of ap-
pointment clause, it should be clear that the power can be exercised by
the surviving spouse at any time after the death of the deceased;
otherwise the bequest will not be deductible even though the spouse
survives the six months, because the power would be held to be not
exercisable "in all events" as the statute specifies.
One of the few reported cases on the subject of marital deduction
was decided in 1953 by the United States District Court in the Western
District of South Dakota. The reported decision does not state the
terms of the will, but it seems that a bequest, conditioned on survival
until distribution, was allowed as a marital deduction since distribution
did occur within the six months' period, in the face of vigorous opposi-
tion by the Commissioner. The opinion indicates that the judge was
greatly influenced by the evident intent of the testator to provide a
marital deduction. 9 The case is on appealya
In Revenue Ruling 54-121,10 the Commissioner ruled that a payment
of insurance proceeds, conditioned upon survival of spouse to the time
s Wis. STATs. (1953) §237.10.
9 Kellar v. Kasper, 53-2 U.S.T.C. Par. 10919 (W.D.S. Dak, 1953).9aEditor's Note: The Kellar case was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Eight Circuit. C.C.H. Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reporter, Par. 11, 501.
10 I.R.B. 1954-14, 8.
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of proof of decedent's death, is a "tainted asset" and not a part of the
marital deduction, even though the payment might in fact be made
within a very short time and within the six months' period. The Ruling
depends on the fact that it does not have to occur within the period.
The Ruling itself points out that it is squarely in conflict with the de-
cision in the Kellar case in basic reasoning.
(d) The adjusted gross estate is reached by certain deductions
which do not include estate and inheritance taxes." On the other hand,
the statutes specifically provide that the marital deduction should be
reduced by any death tax applicable to the same.' 2 Consequently, if it
is desired to obtain the full 50% deduction, care must be taken to pre-
vent allocation of estate and inheritance taxes to the bequest and de-
duction therefrom. Of course, it can be avoided by appropriate pro-
visions in the will. However, the usual provision throwing all the taxes
against the residue will only make the situation worse where the marital
bequest is to be paid out of the residue.
Recently a Revenue Agent took the position that a will, which had
no provision relative to payment of taxes and had a marital bequest in
the popular form to provide the maximum, should be construed as re-
quiring the federal and state death duties to be paid out of residue, and
not out of the marital bequest, in view of the specification that the
bequest should -be the maximum. This case went before the Appellate
Division on a value question, and this rule of construction was there
followed also, but reluctantly and only after an argument. This is a
somewhat tenuous authority on which to rely; it is better to make the
will specific on the point.
(e) As we have stated, the 1954 Code removed the requirements
that a life estate with power of appointment must be in trust and also
that the whole of the corpus was necessary to a deduction, as dis-
tinguished from a specific portion. Desirable as these changes are to
eliminate traps for the unwary and for wills which have not been
revised since 1948, the things which the statutes formerly required are
still desirable otherwise than merely to obtain the marital deduction.
Thus several separate trusts, instead of fractions of one trust, are
desirable from an income tax standpoint, as every estate planner knows.
Likewise, such a trust, instead of a life estate with power, does
avoid the second expense of administration; and, where the power is
not exercised, it even avoids state taxes in such states as do not tax the
non-exercise of a power. Its only disadvantage seems to be the intro-
duction of complexity into the will.
Those who have worked with the regulations are familiar with the
11 §2056 (c) (2).
12 §2056 (b) (4).
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five rules specified as to each trust,'3 which give no particular difficulty
and on the whole seem quite reasonable and in accord with the purpose
of the statute. Essentially they spell out what has been said here.
Probably the forthcoming regulation will extend these rules to the
non-trusteed bequest. It is important to note that, as pointed out before,
the power of appointment must be effective and available at the original
death even though it is permissible to postpone enjoyment of income
during administration of the estate. It hardly needs stating that a
binding agreement as to the exercise of the power will destroy it and
make the bequest nondeductible. It is also of some importance that
text writers believe that a bequest through such a trust of nonproduc-
tive assets, such as a depletable property, might be held to show intent
not to give income to the spouse, and that it is safer to provide the
fiduciary with power to convert such property to other property.
(f) The rules as to life insurance where there is a power of ap-
pointment are much like those dealing with a trust and power of ap-
pointment. Originally there was a good deal of doubt as to whether the
statute recognized the right of withdrawal as a power of appointment,
but fortunately that was cleared up affirmatively by a retroactive amend-
ment before 1948 was over.
Most policies that have been written subsequent to the establishment
and understanding of the Revenue Act of 1948 are so drawn as to
meet all requirements for marital deduction where that is desired and
do not contain hidden provisions which unintentionally tend to knock
out the deduction. Where it is desired to include the proceeds of older
policies in the marital deduction, it is of value to scrutinize them very
closely.
(g) Finally the statute provides that a spouse may cut down a
marital bequest by a disclaimer, but that no marital bequest may be
enlarged by a disclaimer of anyone else.'4 The first part of this rule
does offer an opportunity to cut down an excess of marital deduction
where circumstances have changed or planning has been lacking and
the net effect of the marital deduction bequest before disclaimer is
costly because of its being too large.
III. OPPORTUNITY FOR SAVING OR Loss OF MARITAL DEDUCTION NOT
EXPLICIT IN STATUTES.
There are several matters to consider on this, outside of the express
statute covering the marital deduction.
(a) Before the Revenue Act of 1954, there was an important
leakage of taxes in connection with the marital deduction in that the
credit for estate taxes paid on deaths within the preceding five years
was denied as to all property passing after 1947 from spouse to spouse,
23Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47a (c).
24§2056 (d).
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whether by death or living gift and whether creating marital deduction
or not. The most important thing to watch under that state of affairs
was a bequest of more than fifty per cent to the wife, which gave her
assets, which created a tax in her estate, but no credit. It could be
avoided, of course, by the classic trust of life interest with remainder
over to the next generation. This is no longer a problem as the 1954
Code permits credit of previously paid estate taxes on property re-
ceived from a spouse after 1947 but excludes only that which created
the marital deduction. 15 This is fair.
(b) In many estates there are certain assets, be they stocks or real
estate, on which extensive appreciation is anticipated to occur in the
future. This is particularly true in some closed corporations. It is to be
seen that care should be taken to steer this property away from the
marital deduction, perhaps to an ordinary non-appointive trust with
remainder in the next generation so as to keep this appreciation from
building up in the estate of the survivor; otherwise such a build-up
could easily consume the benefits of the marital deduction. It follows
from the same reasoning that it would be desirable to use property
likely to depreciate, either physically or otherwise, in connection with
marital deduction. This is on the same theory as that under which a
trust may be set up in estate planning for consumption of principal by
the surviving spouse so as to minimize her estate as an additional sav-
ing over the original marital deduction.
(c) Where opportunity permits, savings may sometimes be achieved
in a review of the marital deduction during the period between the
date of death and the initiation of probate or the filing of proofs under
insurance policies. It is entirely possible that changes of circumstances
or valuation of assets may result in a bequest which is in excess of
marital deduction, although intended to provide the same and that
disclaimers and insurance elections might be made at this stage to bring
the maximum of marital deduction savings to the estate, while such
actions might be precluded later.
(d) In every estate of size, a study is necessary, of course, at the
anniversary of death to ascertain which date of valuation should be
elected by the executor. This familiar study should now be supple-
mented by a consideration of the marital deduction at the same time.
The conditions necessary to establish marital deduction, such as lack
of terminability, effectiveness of power of appointment, etc., exist only
as of the date of death and do not enter into the study a year later.
Nevertheless the valuation for the marital deduction will follow the
date of principal election (including disposal date if sold during the
year) and the value of such assets might change so as to be entirely
different from the value of the estate as a whole and thus produce a
15 §2013.
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change in the marital deduction which might influence the election as to
valuation date.
IV. USE OF MARITAL DEDUCTIONS IN ESTATE PLANNING.
(a) On extensive consideration of formulae and tables and even
mechanical counters. I have come to the conclusion that, while these
devices may give horseback answers, the only safe method involves
analysis of the estates of husband and wife and actual trial computa-
tions based on different hypotheses as to testamentary plans. Fed-
erally, of course, the closer one can get the estates of the two spouses
to equality, the closer one obtains the theoretical maximum tax-saving,
and this goal could then be modified by use of reasonable judgment to
take care of important non-tax problems. Unfortunately this theoreti-
cal simplicity is ruined by several considerations which include:
(a) the duplicate state taxes resulting from the marital bequest
as distinguished from a life estate with remainder over;
(b) duplicate administration expenses for the same reason;
(c) ages of the parties and probable length of survival of one
spouse beyond the other;
(d) the advantage of postponing a large part of the tax to the
death of the survivor; thus easing the problem of providing
liquid funds and also making the liquid funds available for
the use of the survivor, leaving the next generation to
struggle with liquidity, liquidation or sale of closely held
businesses, etc. ;
(e) the income earning potential of the postponed tax;
(f) the possibility of using depreciating assets or reducing mari-
tal trusts as the subject of the marital bequest.
From the foregoing, it will be seen that the conclusion of whether
and how to use the marital deduction statute either by bequest or gift
(even after due allowance for personal non-tax problems) is one which
must be arrived at by patient trial and error, giving heavy weight to
dollar saving along with due consideration to matters of convenience
as well. I have seen published tables showing that in Wisconsin the
maximum benefit of a marital deduction is reached where one spouse
has an estate of $200,000 and the other zero and becomes a costly dis-
advantage when one estate is $500,000 and the spouse's is zero. In the
face of such tables, I have seen substantial advantages obtained in the
use of marital deduction in larger estates and with larger discrepancies
between the two estates simply because of the use of a reducing marital
trust or a wasting asset. A good example of a wasting asset is an em-
ployment contract which provides for payment to the widow for a
given span of years and then ceases. A reducing marital trust permits
the widow to take both principal and income from the trust and live
it up, or give it to her children if in excess of her needs, so that
19551
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those assets appear in neither estate if she survives a reasonable time.
In such a plan security can be provided by the trust provisions as to
the residue. Insurance options may be worked out to the same effect,
while getting the $1,000 per year interest saving.
It will be seen that there is an infinite variety of circumstances and
combinations in estate planning, and that the subject does not lend
itself to rules and tables.
(b) I have been requested to furnish a "formula cause" and dis-
cuss its use. I have attached to the outline a formula clause which we
believe will provide a maximum deduction where that is desired.1" A
formula for maximum may be desirable in a well-organized estate
where the widow is likely to work closely with counsel because, while
there may be many situations where a marital deduction of less than
the maximum would be desirable, this can be achieved through the dis-
claimer after the testator's death. Obviously this is unwise for reliance
where it will not be reviewed and considered at the proper time. With
this caution, I see no objection to using a maximum clause. The clause
submitted to you does not deal with the six months' survival privilege
and common disaster, either of which may be desired in some cases
and not in others, or with the simultaneous death statute. This can be
added by appropriate language after the recommended clause.
(c) The gift tax statute allows a deduction of 50% of each gift
made to a spouse with the substantially same limitations, definitions,
and qualifications which are involved in the estate tax.1 7 The changes
made by the 1954 Code in the estate tax as discussed also appear with
regard to the gift tax. For occasional gifts between spouses, of course,
the deduction is simply a tax-saving. For estate planning the question
of gifts between spouses is usually associated with the same study which
produces the decision as to the scope of marital deduction desired in
the will. A living gift is, of course, cheaper tax-wise than a bequest for
three reasons:
(a) The rates are lower.
(b) It falls into a separate set of brackets.
(c) It removes the tax itself from the estate and thus saves the
tax on the tax.
Where such a gift is indicated otherwise, it becomes even more desir-
16 "1 give and bequeath to the trustees hereinafter named, to have and to hold the
same in trust for the following uses and purposes, such amount as will be re-
quired to obtain the maximum marital deduction in my estate for federal estate
tax purposes, viz., fifty percent (50%) of my adjusted gross estate as reduced
by the value of other property included in my gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes which passes or has passed to my said wife in such a manner as
to qualify for the marital deduction, all computed upon the value used initially
by my executors for purposes of filing returns, such bequest to include only
assets which qualify for said marital deduction."
17 §2523.
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able where a marital deduction can be available under the gift tax rates.
Of course, the reduced gift tax has to enter the detailed computations
which are necessary to the estate planning. This subject is so well
covered in other lectures in this course, that I merely mentioned it in
passing.
V. CONCLUSION.
It is suggested that the two outstanding conclusions on this subject
are, first, the importance of re-checking estate plans, wills and insur-
ance policies frequently, both before and after death, because of changes
in factual situations; and, secondly, the impossibility of reducing the
subject to rules and formulae.
